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Since some of the most important and effective forms of persuasion are
stories, an appropriate task of informal logic and critical thinking is to consider
the use of stories as argument. In what follows, I first sketch a relatively non-
controversial reconstruction of the concept of "argument" as an offering of
grounds for belief or action. I then describe some paradigm cases of stories
that do the work of arguments, and are taken to be important, even by many of
those who do not find them persuasive. I then suggest the importance of
developing effective ways of responding to story arguments. In doing so, I
tentatively take some steps on a road towards a theory of story argument
validity.
Arguments
An argument can be defined as an attempt to persuade or convince someone
to accept some claim or course of action, or demonstrate a certain point, on
the basis of reasons.1 We can see, first of all, that this definition applies to
certain ordinary experiences (as well as following standard definitions of
argument).2 People do attempt to persuade each other to accept claims, to
act in certain ways, to buy soap, to believe in communism or capitalism, to vote
for or against candidates, to interfere with or protect physicians who provide
abortions. Effective persuasion may lead us into marriages, contracts,
religious communities, or wars.
It is clear that there are exceptions to the definition. Formal arguments, for
example, would seem to be arguments, but some of them are offered in logic
books (e.g., "if p then q; q; therefore p") as examples of bad arguments. Some
arguments involving sophistries are offered to amuse (even if some fail at this
aim). Nonetheless, despite these, and other exceptions, it seems that
arguments can be usefully defined as attempts to persuade or convince
someone to accept some claim or course of action, or demonstrate a certain
point, on the basis of reasons. Such a definition is coherent with ordinary
usage, works well enough with the treatment offered in informal logic texts, and
makes sense out of the existence, importance, and practices of informal logic
reflected in literature from the times of Aristotle and Plato to contemporary
articles, essays, and text-books.
Stories as Arguments
It should be noted that to claim of a story that it is an argument is not to claim
that it is merely an argument, or even that its author, if asked, would admit that
it was an argument. For one thing, such an admission might interfere with the
effectiveness of the argument. "I’m just trying to entertain my audience," story-
tellers may explain. Yet, it may be that the best interpretation we can find for
certain aspects of their enterprise is that they are attempting to persuade or
convince at the political, metaphysical, or other levels. Other authors, or these
same authors at other times, may admit that their works are arguments; that
one reason they create these stories is to change their audiences’ ways of
understanding or acting. Some, like Ayn Rand, or Orson Scott Card, will admit
that they write to convey truth and change lives. And some stories are offered
by influential thinkers as attempts to persuade or convince in epistemological,
religious, metaphysical, and moral contexts. What is more important to the
informal logician concerned with attempts to persuade and convince, some of
these stories succeed, to a significant extent, in their purpose of changing the
way their audience believes and acts.
Let’s consider, for example, the effects of the myth of the cave in Plato’s
Republic (Book VII),3 Ayn Rand’s Atlas Shrugged (1992),4 and Toni
Morrison’s The Bluest Eye (1994).
Stories as persuaders: Plato, Rand, and Morrison
The Cave
Many of us are familiar with Plato’s myth of the cave in Book VII of the
Republic; there the ordinary state of people is like that of prisoners in a cave.
These people are chained in place, watching shadows on the walls.
. . . here they have been from their childhood, and have their legs
and necks chained so that they cannot move, and can only see
before them, being prevented by the chains from turning round their
heads. Above and behind them a fire is blazing at a distance, and
between the fire and the prisoners there is a raised way; and you
will see, if you look, a low wall built along the way, like the screen
which marionette players have in front of them, over which they
show the puppets. To them . . . the truth would be literally nothing
but the shadows of the images. (Jowett, 514-515c)
The story continues with a description of what happens when one of the
prisoners escapes, sees the true light of the sun, and returns to the cave to free
others. No longer used to the darkness, the returner can barely see, and
seems to be incompetent to manage in the ordinary world. As Plato explains,
. . . if there were a contest, and he had to compete in measuring the
shadows with the prisoners who had never moved out of the den,
while his sight was still weak, and before his eyes had become
steady (and the time which would be needed to acquire this new
habit of sight might be very considerable) would he not be
ridiculous? Men would say of him that up he went and down he
came without his eyes; and that it was better not even to think of
ascending; and if anyone tried to loose another and lead him up to
the light, let them only catch the offender, and they would put him to
death. (Jowett, 515c-517a)5
The escapee who returned to liberate others is a philosopher like Socrates.
Like Socrates he is not a successful businessman or politician in the cave-
world. Like Socrates he is taken to be somehow both incompetent and a
dangerous threat. And for the readers, who perhaps already identify
themselves with philosophers by the time they have reached Book VII, it
teaches that even if they cannot compete well with ordinary folk for the ordinary
rewards, they are better than the others, and merit the better rewards that await
them (a lesson reinforced by another Platonic story at the end of the Republic,
the "Tale of Er").
As argument, the story is quite effective; it takes the philosopher’s apparent
weakness (if you know so much why aren’t you successful) and turns it into a
strength (it is because I know so much that I am unsuccessful in a world that
mistakes ignorance for truth), and it frees the philosopher from the task once
taken on by the pre-Socratic Thales, of doing well in the Greek analog of the
stock market.6 The story not only makes sense out of the low status of the
philosopher in certain societies, it inspires a certain kind of seeker to
relinquish that status as comparatively worthless, and to pursue the
philosophical light.
The allegory of the cave, and the "Tale of ER," both have long been recognized
as stories. It is worth noting that much of Plato’s work was the telling of stories
about Socrates to rival the stories that others were telling about Socrates.7
Socrates was put to death because of stories many people believed about him
then. The Platonic stories that live today bring him and his work back to life--as
many parents have noticed when their child comes back from that first
philosophy course asking them to define words like "successful." One
(apparently unlikely) response available to these parents, and others
suspicious of this Socratic method, would be to look at Plato’s stories and to
subject them to the same kind of criticisms we offer against arguments whose
conclusions seem dubious. How such a task might be accomplished will be left
to the next section of this paper. For now, let’s consider another author who
has an appeal to a certain number of our students, and whose influence
extended to Alan Greenspan, chairman of the Federal Reserve Board.8 Author
of novels and philosophical essays, Ayn Rand has been known to cite her
fictional works to make her points.9 Of these, she, and many of her readers,
seem to prize the extended argument of Atlas Shrugged.
Atlas Shrugged
In Atlas Shrugged, Rand describes a world in which the industrious and
creative producers go on strike after millennia of being used by non-producing
advocates of what Rand portrays as the pernicious doctrine of altruism. When
these Atlases finally shrug off their burden, the world begins to collapse,
products break, factories close, trains break down, shipping ceases, the lights
begin to go out in the big cities. In the world Rand describes, the advocates of
altruism (who say life is not worth living unless lived selflessly for others), like
the newspaper writer Ellsworth Toohey in Rand’s The Fountainhead, are small-
minded small people, resentful and cruel. On the other hand, the advocates of
selfishness (or egoism) are magnanimous, great-souled individuals. These
egoists take joy in the exercise of their creative powers, and take their own
lives as the centers of their existence. Their goal is the furthering of their own
happiness. Throughout the novel, there are extended philosophical discussions
of the virtue of selfishness. These culminate in a three hour long radio speech
by the protagonist of the work, John Galt. Those who elevate the abstract
interests of the group over the concrete reality of the individual person are
portrayed as misguided, crooked, deceptive, vicious, and worse. Those who
stand for the individual’s right to pursue his or her own life, liberty, or property
are portrayed as heroic, dedicated, productive human beings.
In this work, the productive organize, go on strike, and the novel ends with the
hints of a promised rebirth of a great society of great souled individuals
producing and creating value for their own selfish reasons, and thus generating
a greater and more glorious world.
Perhaps the most persuasive scenes (as opposed to the arguments) in the
novel occur when we see the destruction and decay which results when there is
no longer an egoistic pride in craft, and the great transportation and travel
machines (trains in the novel) slowly break down.
The human individual in this work is his or her own purpose in existence. To
thrive as a human, requires, according to the logic of the novel, self-respect.
Self-respect comes from being productive, being productive comes from
surviving and thriving as a human accepting only the authority of one’s own
decisions based on reason. Family, clan, nation, race, etc., cannot, and
according to the philosophy of Rand and Galt, ought not to interfere with
individuals living their own lives for themselves.
The novel has a clear appeal to some young men and women who are tired of
being told to give up their own desires and career aspirations to enter the
family business, or who are counseled to do something practical with their
education, instead of what they think will make themselves happy, based on
their own self-knowledge. The egoists are portrayed as courageous, and great
souled, creating and maintaining factories, philosophies, sculptures and
paintings for the joy it gives them. The altruists come across as parasites who
delight in keeping the great down to their own level, and who think that the only
kind of merit that merits consideration is that introduced by need.
Rand’s works, as far as I know, have not been used nearly as much in
philosophy and literature courses as Plato. Yet, some college students find a
certain appeal in a philosopher who tells them that their lives are their own, that
they need not accept any authority but their own careful judgment, and that they
should do what makes them happy, even if it frustrates the plans of others.
An interesting feature of Rand’s fiction is that it contains what she, apparently,
took to be the best statement of her arguments, and in other writings, she
quotes her characters to make her points. Furthermore, for those of us who do
philosophy and would like to reach a greater audience, her strategy may merit
further study. Later, in the section on how to respond to the special challenges
of persuasive stories, I will discuss what I take to be an effective response to
this strategy.
The Bluest Eye
In a society where a certain notion of beauty is central, and where romantic
love is portrayed as an ideal state, to create a work in which these are
persuasively portrayed as pernicious shows a great deal of rhetorical skill in
making what one might have thought the weaker case to be the stronger. Toni
Morrison’s accomplishment rivals, perhaps surpasses, that of Gorgias, in his
"Encomium on Helen." 10 (Kaufmann 1961: 54-57) In The Bluest Eye, popular
concepts of beauty and romance are convincingly portrayed as sources of
oppression, mainstays of racism, and ultimately corrupting influences. Morrison
show how these two ideas of romantic love and physical beauty destroy the life
of one of her characters (Pauline) after she’s been exposed to them in the
movies. These ideas led her into ranking everyone on a scale of beauty, made
her feel bad in comparison, made her and her family look bad in comparison,
and eventually led her to hate much of her life. As Pauline says, "Them pictures
gave me a lot of pleasure, but it made coming home hard, and looking at
Cholly [her husband] hard" (Morrison 1994: 123). By the time we learn how ugly
she thinks her own daughter is (p. 126), many of us are ready to accept
Morrison’s claim (on p. 122) that romantic love and physical beauty are
"probably the most destructive ideas in the history of human thought."
This novel, throughout, shows the damage of these ideas, and the racism that
this kind of media based valuation reflects and supports. The reader who might
have found the parable of the cave in the Republic uninteresting might yet,
through the tale of The Bluest Eye, begin to question the rules and standards of
a movie theatered world in which people come to hate and reject reality
because of what they take to be the truer better world projected on the screen
before them. Even if unwilling to surrender the ideals of romantic love and
beauty, readers of this book will, I suspect, come to question them in light of the
destructive effects they are shown to have in this novel. In doing that, these
readers will make implicit assumptions explicit, and cease to take them for
granted.11
The Importance of Developing Responses to Persuasive Stories
Consider some possible effects of Rand’s writing. The influenced reader of a
work like Atlas Shrugged will be more likely to accept capitalism as an ideal,
vote against programs that allocate resources on the basis of need, and tend
to reject any collectivist enterprise that ranks the needs of the group over the
rights of individual members. Suppose we think that needs of some individuals
or groups of individuals do, at least sometimes, entail obligations on others.
We can formulate arguments to this effect. We can even criticize the
arguments present in Rand’s stories and articles as arguments. But, the reader
persuaded by the images in Atlas Shrugged (or Anthem) of a world gone to
seed because of taking needs as right-conferring, will, I would suggest, be
likely to continue to take their experiences of the world as portrayed in the
Rand stories quite seriously. Look what happens when you do that, they may
think. They might even say it: "The altruists of the world keep the productive
people like Hank Reardon, Dagny Taggart, and John Galt from making the
world a better place. When you reward need instead of merit, people will
develop their needs, not their virtues, just as in Atlas Shrugged."
Three Strategies for Responding to Persuasive Stories
As indicated, we can criticize the arguments in the story or in Rand’s other
work. Yet, there are at least three other kinds of responses to the challenges
the tale offers (also appropriate for those who want to respond to Plato or
Morrison): The first kind is more critical; but may lack sufficient rhetorical force.
The second way is in a sense, more constructive, more forceful, more
profitable (if effective), but more difficult. The third way is more like what we
would expect to see offered by an informal logician.
1. Address it as a story
We can criticize the story as a story. One way to do this is to point out that
some aspect of the story is not plausible. Truth does not need to be plausible;
it just needs to be supported by the evidence. It is not plausible to many of us
that most people would administer what they take to be dangerous amounts of
electrical shock to others, just because they are told to do so by someone in a
lab coat. But the high rate of compliance during the Milgram experiments
indicates otherwise. (Milgram 1974; Cialdini 1993: 209-215)
But convincing fiction, unlike the truth, needs to be plausible. So, we can try to
show that Galt is an unconvincing character. We could argue that most of the
people who hold altruist’s kinds of views regarding the merits of need are not
like Rand’s villains. We might simply argue against the credibility of a plot that
is based on the principle that the truly selfish will benefit from each other’s true
selfishness. To those who do not share Rand’s beliefs in limit-transcending
human creativity and productivity, it doesn’t seem plausible that things would
work out so that the world would be a better place if we all looked out for
ourselves instead of others, given that resources are limited. So, we can
criticize the work as fiction, arguing that people like that don’t act like that. The
advantage of this kind of criticism, when effective, is that it cuts to the heart of
what might have made the story a convincing addition to our experience of the
world. But, the disadvantage of this is that it may present some of the same
difficulties we encounter arguing with thought experiments. For what many
thought experiments do is help us see the implications of our assumptions, and
the best our criticism can do is to point out those assumptions.
But, this suggests a second way of responding to the story. Here, we would
address the story in terms of its advantages, while indicating that one of the
features of a story used as argument involves the implicit acceptance of certain
principles. At the critical level, this response can be put into words as, "of
course that is the way things work out in Atlas Shrugged, The book takes place
in Rand’s world, a world which follows her rules. Another author could tell a
story that takes place in a world of their own design, and then things would turn
out quite differently."
2. Respond to it with another story
One could respond to Rand with other books. "Read Morrison," one could say,
"and you’ll see that we are obligated to respond to need." Sometimes, when
the nature of the response as response needs to be more clear, we can try to
present another story, written by as good a writer, which does respond
explicitly as story to Rand’s work. (The need for good writing has to do with the
fact that a refutation that does not command the audience’s attention is unlikely
to refute an argument which is attractive to that same audience.)
In the case of Rand, there is such a book. Nancy Kress, in her novel, Beggars
in Spain (1993), shows how simple egoism, and the good Horatio Alger virtues
may fail someone completely in an era of swift technological change.
Furthermore, the non-productive needy of today may be the sources of
tomorrow’s growth. She does this with what seems to be a conscious
awareness of Rand’s philosophy, which she puts in the mouth of her character,
Kenzo Yagai. Chapter three of Beggars (28-32) is explicitly devoted to Kenzo
Yagai and his philosophy. Yagai explains the importance of the individual’s
own efforts, and the importance of being an honest free trader of the results of
one’s own productive efforts (see especially the quotation from his speech on
pp. 30-31). A productive researcher himself, he would have been quite at
home as the protagonist in a Rand novel. Beggars in Spain, in a sense, shows
what we told in the criticism about how Rand’s world works. The Randian world
of Atlas Shrugged may work the way it does not necessarily because that is
the way the world works, but because that is the way a Randian world works.
One can say, if another author were to describe the applications of Rand’s
principles in a world where Rand does not control the plot, these principles
might not work the same way. If the story seems more plausible than Rand’s,
the characters more three dimensional, the situations more textured, then
Rand’s polemic will have been replied to at a level that addresses its
attractions.
This occurs in the case of Beggars in Spain. Kress’s response shows what
that criticism tells. Kress presents a world in which people are convincingly
portrayed as having productive abilities nourished by wealthy families while
others are hampered by familial and social neglect. Kress’s world is a world in
which one’s neuro-physiology can be influenced by the environment. In Kress’s
story, genetic engineering and high tech medical and psychological care, and
educational opportunities are more available to the wealthy. Despite all this,
the race is not always to the swift. Since Kress portrays a world of such
realities while specifically (and fairly, I think) showing how Rand’s position
begins to fail when one’s accomplishments turn out to be the result of the
fortunate or unfortunate genetic planning of one’s parents. The similarity to our
world in which even productivity can have unproductive consequences shows
how Rand’s principles can fail to work out. Also, Kress’s story reaches more
readers than a criticism in a philosophical journal.
3. The Third Way: Informal Logical Analysis of the Story as Argument
For rhetorical and persuasive purposes, I recommend responding to a work in
the arena of its greatest effects . Therefore, I think that the best response to
Rand is Kress; though a response in an even wider arena, e.g., film or
television, might persuade even more people. But, as an informal logician, one
does not work only at the level of persuasion. Even when one is aware that the
analysis offered in a philosophical journal will not (at least as quickly) have the
widespread effects of a profitable novel, there is a concern to ask and answer
questions about whether or not a persuasive story offers a good argument. As
an informal logician, I am interested in questions about whether or not a
particular story taken as argument ought to be persuasive, whether or not we
should accept the essentials of its premises, whether these premises present
good reasons for accepting the conclusions. In other words, I am interested in
the soundness and validity, so to speak, of persuasive stories considered as
arguments.
If a story can show, for example, how certain attitudes and behavior lead to
destructive consequences, then that story presents a good argument for
accepting the claim that these attitudes and behaviors are destructive. For
such a story to work it needs to have a certain kind of story validity. For us to
analyze such a story in terms of its story validity, we need to consider its
premises (implicit and explicit), state them clearly, and determine if these
premises are good reasons for accepting the conclusion.
This is not easy. To analyze Morrison’s Bluest Eye as an argument about how
certain treatment leads to certain results requires a lot of work, and also
requires a great effort at fairness. Even if it contains argument, the story is
more, as stated before, than the argument it contains. Artistic features of the
story, including the possibility of deliberate ambiguity, may interfere with this
kind of analysis. Yet, if we can’t analyze it with the tools appropriate to ordinary
arguments, that does not mean it is a bad argument; it may mean that we need
to develop new tools.
In The Bluest Eye, it is, I would argue, clear that Morrison is persuasively
showing us how certain attitudes and behavior lead to certain destructive
effects. As the narrator states, " since why is difficult to handle, one must take
refuge in how." (Morrison 1994: 6.) Yet, to respond to the question "should the
story be persuasive?" requires us to consider evidence. (One of the hardest
things about doing informal logic, is we often need to consider the adequacy of
the evidence offered for a thesis, and this requires investigation.) In the case of
The Bluest Eye, we would, for example, need to consider research about the
general effects on minority self-esteem of majority ideals and relative
deprivation. We would have to consider historical claims about the relationship
between skin tone and social treatment within the African American community
and between African Americans and others in the United States. We would
have to consider evidence about people responding to media imagery of
ideals, and the intersection of such ideals with racism. We would have to
consult with social scientists and historians. Then, if they confirmed what
Morrison said, we cannot reject her construction on the basis of such
researches. To further add to the complexity and difficulty of our task, we need
to recall that since Morrison’s work is based on her own experience,12 it is
itself important data, and as such the relationship between it and theory is such
that either, when accepted, may be used to criticize the other. Thus, if historical
and social scientific researches do not make sense of the possibility of The
Bluest Eye, then these theories may be what we deem lacking.
But, at least as far as my own limited researches in these areas go,
contemporary theories are not lacking in terms of coherence with the data
reflected in The Bluest Eye. As a matter of fact, The Bluest Eye is assigned
reading in some social science courses and is used by some sociology
instructors to bring life to sociological work on stratification.
A Few Concluding Words about Stories As Arguments
Story arguments may be effective because they enter the experienced worlds
of their audiences.13 As Aristotle noted in the Rhetoric, the argument whose
premises are assumed, the argument by enthymeme, is often the most
successful. An argument that does not need to be explicitly stated because it is
accepted by the audience, has at least three things in its favor in terms of
persuasion. First, its premises are less likely to be criticized since they are not
explicitly stated; secondly, the premises are accepted by the audience; thirdly,
such an argument reflects the persuaders’ knowledge of what is and is not
acceptable to their audience, and an ability to craft arguments and examples
that are consistent with that audience’s experience of the world. As Elgin has
pointed out, a great deal of the persuasive task can be accomplished by
putting it into the framework of a deeply entrenched socially shared story.14
Stories themselves can sometimes effectively carry the burden of the
persuasive enthymeme. Before an audience that shares stories,15 one story
can be rhetorically balanced by allusions to another. An ardent Rand fan from
the United States might be effectively challenged by a brief allusion to the
Jimmy Stuart film, "It’s a Wonderful Life." (Capra 1946)
As indicated, the well told story can be effective because it allows so much to
be brought in implicitly. The very presence of a traditional story form carries
with it traditional notions about the role of character in moral decision making.
Since the time of Aristotle, enthymeme16 has been considered one of the
most effective forms of argument, because it relies on implicit premises which
are more difficult to challenge because they are implicit.
In this paper, I have suggested that we can respond to persuasive stories in a
variety of ways. These include criticizing them as arguments or by addressing
actual arguments found within them. We can criticize them as thought
experiments, by telling and alluding to alternative stories, and by treating them
as reports of experience. We can, for example, analyze Rand, Plato, or
Morrison as making claims about how people act in certain circumstances,
and then test those claims against the best available data.17
We won’t do a very good job of meeting the challenge of persuasive stories if
we ignore them. Stories are an important part of human experience. People
change their minds about issues after encountering stories.18 By concerning
ourselves with fiction, we continue the tradition of critical thinkers and informal
logicians whose concern with persuasion has led us to examine advertising
and the media. We are following through on our awareness that there may be
more to the story.
 
Endnotes
1For an extended treatment of persuasion and conviction, and one way of
distinguishing between them, see The New Rhetoric (Perelman and Olbrechts-
Tyteca 1969: 26-31. They "apply the term persuasive to argumentation that
only claims validity for a particular audience, and the term convincing to
argumentation that presumes to gain the adherence of every rational human
being." (p. 28)
2S.v. "argument"; Scribner-Bantam English Dictionary (1979). See also The
Random House Dictionary of the English Language (1966), s.v.: "Argument,
controversy, dispute imply the expression of opinions for and against some
idea."
3Benjamin Jowett’s translation can be found on-line at
http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/republic.mb.txt. Another standard translation (Paul
Shorey’s) can be found in Hamilton and Cairns’ The Complete Dialogues of
Plato Including the Letters (1973: 575-844).
4This 35th anniversary edition of Atlas Shrugged is a facsimile of the edition
published in 1957, and includes a new (1991) introduction by Leonard Peikoff.
5For comparison, see Shorey’s rendering of these passages (Hamilton and
Cairns 1973: 747-749).
6For more on Thales’ acquisition of wealth, see Aristotle’s Politics (1259a5-
35).
7One striking example of Plato’s ability to seriously compete with other story
tellers like Aristophanes can be found in Plato’s Symposium, where he moves
from one style of story telling to another, showing his mastery of all. The
Symposium itself can be read as a story that ends with a claim about stories
and their writers, i.e., "the genius of comedy was the same with that of tragedy,
and that the true artist in tragedy was an artist in comedy also." (Jowett: 223d);
the same passage is handled somewhat differently by Michael Joyce in his
translation (Hamilton and Cairns 1973: 574).
8Three of Greenspan’s essays occur in Rand’s Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal
(1967).
9For example, in her introduction to Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal, she
describes the book as "a non-fiction footnote to Atlas Shrugged"(p. ix). In the
first of the essays, she responds to an objection to one of her points with a long
(though abridged) quotation from Atlas Shrugged (part of John Galt’s speech,
pp. 1063-1065).
10For a summary discussion of the status of such work in Greek culture, see
Educating Heroes (Kagan 1994: 21-22).
11For one discussion of the importance of this, see Alfred North Whitehead’s
"The Human Soul," in his Adventures of Ideas (1933: 10-25), especially pp. 10-
11.
12Morrison discusses some of her experiences, including her meeting with an
African American girl who wanted blue eyes, in her 1993 "Afterword" (see,
e.g., pp. 209-210).
13Some stories may work because of the use of enthymeme. Some because
they are not taken as argument, and thus don’t generate the kind of resistance
an argument might. The use of stories to persuade is one way of avoiding the
adversarial paradigm discussed in Janice Moulton's, "A Paradigm of
Philosophy: The Adversary Method,"(Harding and Hintikka 1983: 149-164).
For more on the value of stories as method, see Joyce Trebilcot’s "Ethics of
Method: Greasing the Machine and Telling Stories" (1991: 45-51). Some
stories may succeed in persuasion due to aesthetic appeal. Others may do
their work, as Orson Scott Card suggests in Maps in a Mirror (1990: 273-276),
because they add to our experience and form a part of our own memories of
the basic dynamics of the world. They may add to what David Shachar, in his
1977 Hebrew Literature lectures, called the "experienced truth" in a story.
Card’s treatment suggests (to me) that one reason stories may be effective
persuaders is that they may change who we are. Card suggests that the
stories we encounter include stories about ourselves, and he goes so far as to
write, "Our very identity is a collection of the stories we have come to believe
about ourselves." (Card 1990: 273)
14This is a recurring theme in Elgin’s works on "verbal self-defense," such as
The Gentle Art of Verbal Self-Defense (1980) and Genderspeak: Men,
Women, and the Gentle Art of Verbal Self-Defense (1993). It also occurs in
some of her fictional works, e.g., Native Tongue (1984), and its sequels The
Judas Rose (1987), and Earthsong (1994).
15The audience needs to share the stories. The need for such sharing may be
reflected in the central theses of E.D. Hirsch, Jr.'s Cultural Literacy: What Every
American Needs to Know, with an Appendix, What Literate Americans Know
(1987).
16See Aristotle’s discussion of the use of enthymeme and its importance to
rhetoric in his Rhetoric, Bk. 1: ch. 2, especially 1356b—1357b. For future work
on the use of stories in persuasion, I suspect that re-examination of his Poetics
will prove quite useful.
17We need to keep in mind the possibility that the story itself may contain
useful suggestions or insights not yet present in the research. The story might
even be a factor in generating later research. I hope future works on
relationships between stories and reasoning consider the heuristic role of
stories in the "logic of discovery."
18Consider, for example, the influence of Harriet Beecher Stowe’s Uncle
Tom’s Cabin in the 19th century’s campaign against slavery, and the role of
Upton Sinclair’s The Jungle in the development of meat inspection law in the
early 1900’s.
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